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believes the United States might experience. He finds that the most likely form
of conflict will be Kosovo-like peace operations, and he explains why operations
addressing these conflicts are so difficult.
This section provides some of the most
dramatic and compelling information
and analysis in the book, particularly
concerning his operational distinctions
between conflict suppression and state
building (the latter being the most problematic for this country). When America
Fights concludes with a recommendation
of realistic internationalist national strategy based on five major influences of
modern grand strategy, and it offers the
reader fifteen guidelines on how to increase the probability of success in peace
operations.
The book provides a consistent thread of
argument and analysis on the use of
American armed force. However, notwithstanding the author’s preface, When
America Fights is a highly opinionated
work. It does not comprehensively analyze the implications of other possible
points on the spectrum of conflict, nor
does it pursue alternative or possible
conflictual guidelines that might be generated by applying the theoretical framework to those other types of conflict.
Further, the two-tier world concept simply is neither the only way nor the most
widely accepted one of attempting to organize the chaos of the post–Cold War
international environment. Finally, the
conclusion that there are two types of
armed force employments—of necessity
(forced on the nation) or of choice (at
the nation’s discretion)—is most intriguing (I have already adopted the lexicon in
my courses) but it is not the only
typology that one might consider.
There are two admittedly minor but irritating faults in the book. First, being a
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very old-fashioned academic, this
reviewer appreciates the value and information provided by footnotes; they are
totally lacking in this work. True, there is
a bibliography following each chapter,
but that is an empty vessel for serious research. Second, Ralph Peters, a most insightful strategist of the current age who
is quoted in the last chapter, is a retired
Army, not Air Force, officer.
When America Fights is an excellent book
on the use of armed force as applied to
peace operations. It is a book with a
point of view and a strong theoretical
base. Regardless of whether one agrees
with the author on the flow and form of
his argument, the reader will find the
material engrossing and invaluable—
even though this nation is now engaged
in what Snow has viewed as the less likely
scenario for force employment, that of
necessity.
JONATHAN E. CZARNECKI

Naval War College, Monterey Programs Office

Carter, Ashton B., and John P. White, eds. Keeping
the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001. 326pp. $50

This book “addresses a need widely recognized but long neglected: to adapt and
modernize the system by which the
United States manages the largest and
most successful security establishment in
history.” Do not be misled into thinking
that the word “managing” in the title
suggests a dry treatment of managerial
practices requiring extensive change.
Keeping the Edge deals with that, but it
primarily examines many key organizational strategy issues; these studies will
have comprehensive value to anyone
within academia or the national security
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environment wishing to improve what
the authors regard as management and
organizational shortfalls that impede implementation of wise strategy and policy
choices. Collectively, the distinguished
editors and authors contend that, if unattended, these shortcomings will seriously
diminish our unmatched military capability. At the same time, they hold that
the “national security establishment is
deficient not so much in deciding what
to do” as in lacking the means to implement defense policy effectively.
The book is organized into eleven chapters, each of which discusses deficiencies
in a key area of national security. Each
chapter describes the changing security
environment relevant to the subject of
discussion, then offers comprehensive
suggestions to improve the execution of
whatever policy choices are made. Most
of the chapters also provide superb insight into what future policy choices
should be. Among the chapters are:
“Managing Defense for the Future,”
“Keeping the Edge in Joint Operations,”
“Exploiting the Internet Revolution,”
“Keeping the Edge in Intelligence,”
“Countering Asymmetric Threats,”
“Keeping the Technological Edge,” “Advancing the Revolution in Business Affairs,” “Ensuring Quality People in
Defense,” “Managing the Pentagon’s International Relations,” “Strengthening
the National Security Interagency Process,” and “Implementing Change.” Each
chapter is comprehensive and would
serve as an excellent guide to new policy
makers who wish actually to see their
policies implemented. I doubt that any
organizational or managerial improvement has been omitted.
The material in the book resulted from a
research collaboration project between
the Kennedy School of Government,
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Harvard University, and Stanford
University. The list of contributors represents a who’s who in national security experience and in the study of national
security processes: Ashton B. Carter,
David Chu, Victor A. DeMarines, John
Deutch, Robert J. Hermann, Arnold
Kanter, Michael J. Lippitz, Judith A.
Miller, Sean O’Keefe, William J. Perry,
Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Brent
Scowcroft, John M. Shalikashvili, and
John P. White. The core group of authors
have occupied practically every senior
position in the national security environment, while others have dedicated their
professional lives to the study of national
security policies and supporting structures. They speak with as much authority
as one could possibly find in a single
book.
This book addresses those in policy positions who wish to reform organizations
and practices that, according to the authors, increasingly sap the vitality of our
military capability; it is concrete as well
as comprehensive in its recommendations. Keeping the Edge will also help people who are not currently in positions to
affect policy to understand the substantial flaws in the anatomy and physiology
of the organizations that implement national security policies. Experienced national security scholars and practitioners
will respond to the authors’ contention
that existing policy-implementing practices themselves are a threat to future
U.S. national security.
The book must be read by anyone interested in improving these processes and
structures; it contains important guides
for people who can marshal the influence
at least to begin organizational and managerial change, if only on the margin. The
preface warns that the authors have no illusions that the chronic organizational
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and management problems will be solved
any time soon. One can only hope, nevertheless, that this book’s comprehensive
recommendations will encourage and
guide courageous leaders to make a start.
WILLIAM E. TURCOTTE

Naval War College

Steinbruner, John D. Principles of Global Security.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.
270pp. $44.95

Unconvincing—that one word accurately
describes this effort of the prolific author
and former Brookings fellow John
Steinbruner to explain why and how the
“potentially catastrophic consequences of
traditional security practices” mandate
radical changes in U.S. defense policies.
Steinbruner argues that discontinuities in
the international system make obsolete
the realist view that nation-states need to
rely on military power for their security.
From this premise, he implies that the
United States should not seek to maintain military superiority over potential
opponents. In this new formula, deterrence, which he describes as a Cold War
doctrine, should be “subordinated to the
countervailing idea of reassurance.”
Globalization, Steinbruner holds, has
made it “too expensive to rule by force,”
and competition among nations or societies is being replaced by cooperation;
therefore, the whole notion of needing a
strong military defense is dangerous. Unfortunately for his premise, Steinbruner
then turns around and uses a pseudorealist argument to explain why other nations would “naturally” seek to oppose
and confront American military superiority in a world in which they are
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benefiting from United States–led
globalization.
At its core, the book’s fundamental problem is that it approaches all military issues as if they were but subsets of
strategic nuclear deterrence. The irony of
this approach—Cold War thinking at its
grimmest—appears completely to have
eluded the author, who spent much of
his scholarly career worrying about issues
of deterrence theory and nuclear command and control. At the same time,
Steinbruner does not see the end of the
Cold War as a victory for deterrence or
democratic ideology. Referring to it
rather as an unexpected “spontaneous
event” that took everyone involved by
surprise, he sees it as the result of “the
working of very large forces”—presumably the forces of globalization, although
he is never very clear on that.
Steinbruner’s treatment of globalization
itself—which he describes only in terms
of advances in technology and population dynamics—is disappointing. Others
have written much better treatments. The
book does not contain a serious examination of the direct impact of globalization on national security or military
forces, only a continuing assertion that
globalization has effects and that, whatever they are, they justify adoption of the
author’s “reassurance” policies. These
policies are similar to, but more radical
and seemingly less practical than, those
put forward as “cooperative security” by
former secretary of defense William
Perry. He certainly would not agree with
Steinbruner that all national militaries
must be equalized in capabilities and
force structure. Steinbruner cites the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
and the founding of Nato as examples of
reassurance and equal treatment of nations
in regard to security, but he forgets to

3

